How To Beat A Fleeing And Eluding Charge?

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What is the sentence for fleeing and eluding in Georgia

A person found guilty of misdemeanor fleeing or attempting to elude in Georgia will be guilty of a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature. The accused will have a fine between $1,000 and $5,000 and a jail term between 30 days and 12 months. Jail time beyond 30 days can be probated by the judge.

Is fleeing and eluding a misdemeanor in Illinois

Fleeing or Attempting to Elude the Police Being pulled over by a police officer can be a frustrating and, sometimes, frightening experience. But, once directed to bring your vehicle to a stop, it is always best to keep calm and pull over in a safe place. You may have seen suspects on television or YouTube videos attempting to outrun and elude the police.

• These chases are extremely dangerous, sometimes resulting in fatal collisions.
• What happens to those who don’t pull over? In Illinois, you can be arrested and charged with Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a Police Officer.
• In Illinois, fleeing from a police officer is a criminal offense with serious potential consequences.

If you don’t cooperate when you are directed to pull you over by a police officer, you face penalties including the suspension of your driver’s license, high fines, and even jail time. What Does the Law Require? Section 11-204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code requires that you comply when a police officer directs you with an audible or visual signal to stop your vehicle.

1. The signal may be by hand, voice, siren, red or blue light.
2. The law requires that the officer giving the signal be in a police uniform.
3. If the officer is driving a vehicle at the time the stop is initiated, the vehicle must display illuminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights in addition to an audible horn or siren, which would indicate that the vehicle is an official police vehicle.

Penalties for Fleeing and Eluding Police in Illinois Fleeing or attempting to elude the police is a criminal offense under Illinois law. This offense is typically charged as a Class A misdemeanor. The maximum penalty is up to 1 year in jail and a $2,500.00 fine plus mandatory court costs.

If you are convicted of this offense, the Illinois Secretary of State will suspend the offender’s driver’s license for 6 months. A second offense will result in 1-year suspension. Fleeing and eluding the police can be charged as a Class 4 felony for a 3rd or subsequent offense, punishable by one to three years jail time and a $25,000 fine.

Aggravated Fleeing and Eluding Furthermore, this offense can be charged as a Class 4 felony if any of the following also occur at the time of the offense:

The offender drives 21 mph or more over speed limitThe offender causes bodily injury to any individualThe offender causes property damage in excess of $300The defendant disregards more than two (2) or more traffic control devices (i.e. stop sign, stop light)The offender conceals or alters the vehicle’s registration plate.

A conviction for aggravated fleeing and eluding will result in a revocation of the defendant’s driver’s license. A second or subsequent offense may be charged as a Class 3 felony. A vehicle used in commission of the offense is subject to seizure and forfeiture.

Lack of Intent – You didn’t know the police were pursuing you.Threats – You were forced to evade due to threats.Mistaken Identity – You own the car, but you weren’t driving.Necessity – You were in an emergency situation and you couldn’t stop.

How we can Help It is always best to seek the legal representation of an experienced lawyer when charged with a criminal offense. If you’ve been charged with Fleeing and Eluding in Illinois, contact the defense attorneys at The Davis Law Group, P.C. The legal team at The Davis Law Group, P.C.

has been defending the people of Illinois against traffic-related offenses for decades. A conviction can have severe consequences on your family, career and life in general. The lawyers at The Davis Law Group, P.C. understand the confusion, uncertainty, and fear that you are facing. Our Illinois traffic defense lawyers will review the charges against you and ensure that you understand the options available to you.

At The Davis Law Group P.C, we offer a free consultations to prospective clients. Contact us today to learn more about our services.

Is fleeing and attempting to elude a felony in Georgia?

If a person commits one of these actions in his or her attempt to flee, they will be charged with a felony-level offense. The penalties are much more significant for a felony-level charge, and include: a fine between $5,000 and $10,000. a minimum possible prison term of 1 year.

Can fleeing and eluding be expunged in Florida?

Fleeing and Attempting to Elude Law Enforcement in Orlando In the state of Florida, fleeing a law enforcement officer or attempting to elude is a serious felony charge. In most situations, individuals are charged with a third-degree felony. Unfortunately, those convicted of fleeing and eluding will never be able to have the charge expunged or sealed in the future, which means it will always remain on your criminal record.

• Drives a vehicle on a Florida highway or street;
• After the driver was ordered by a duly authorized law enforcement officer to remain stopped; and
• The driver, aware that the duly authorized law enforcement officer had ordered him/her to stop either

1. Intentionally or purposely failed or refused to stop the vehicle and comply with the officer’s order; or
2. Having stopped the vehicle, fled intentionally in a vehicle in an effort to elude or escape the officer.

While this is the basic definition of fleeing and eluding, there are aggravating circumstances which may leave the accused facing more serious penalties. These circumstances include:

• The occurrence of serious bodily injury or death
• Activation of officer’s sirens and lights
• Reckless or high speed driving

Fleeing or attempting to elude law enforcement can create an extremely dangerous situation with catastrophic results in some cases. Regardless of how minor or serious your case may be, it is important to consult with a skilled defense attorney. Defenses to Charges of Fleeing and Attempting to Elude Law Enforcement in Florida A conviction for fleeing and eluding could affect your life forever.

1. Essentially, whether you are found guilty could be determined by the prosecutor’s ability (or inability) to prove beyond a doubt that you were aware (had knowledge) that a law enforcement officer had ordered you to stop, and that you intentionally did not.
2. Running from a police officer who has a clearly marked patrol car with lights activated is considering fleeing as well.

The defense your attorney will develop will depend on the facts of your case, the availability (or lack of) evidence, and other factors. It is also important to note that the state must prove every element of a crime in order for the defendant to be found guilty.

• A maximum of five (5) years in prison
• A maximum of five (5) years probation
• Maximum of $5,000 in fines
• Driver’s license suspension of between one (1) and five (5) years

If you are convicted and the circumstances involve high speeds/reckless driving or result in serious bodily injury or death, the penalties increase substantially in terms of number of years in prison/probation and fine amounts. Contact Adams & Luka Today While it may not seem a serious crime, fleeing and eluding should absolutely be taken seriously, as a conviction could cost you not only your freedom, but reputation and career as well.

What class felony is fleeing and eluding in Florida?

Penalties for Fleeing and Eluding – The penalties for Fleeing and Eluding a Law Enforcement / Police Officer in Florida are severe, and jail or prison is a significant possibility even for first-time offenders.

General Fleeing and Eluding (No Aggravating Circumstances)- the offense is classified as a third degree felony, with penalties of up to 5 years in prison or 5 years of probation, and a $5,000 fine. A conviction will also result in a mandatory driver’s license revocation, which will range from 1 to 5 years in duration;

Fleeing and Eluding: Sirens and Lights Activated – third degree felony, punishable by up to 5 years in prison or 5 years of probation, as well as a $5,000 fine and a mandatory driver’s license revocation ranging from 1 to 5 years;

Fleeing and Eluding: Sirens and Lights Activated with High Speed or Reckless Driving – second degree felony, with penalties of up to 15 years in prison or 15 years of probation, as well as a $10,000 fine and a mandatory driver’s license revocation ranging from 1 to 5 years;

Fleeing and Eluding: Sirens and Lights Activated with High Speed or Reckless Driving Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death – first degree felony, with penalties of up to 30 years in prison or 30 years of probation, as well as a $10,000 fine and mandatory license revocation ranging from 1 to 5 years. Upon conviction, a court is required to sentence a defendant to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years.

How much time can you get for fleeing and eluding in Wisconsin

What penalties do I face for fleeing/eluding in Wisconsin? – Fleeing and eluding is a Class I felony in Wisconsin. That means that upon conviction the defendant faces up to 3.5 years prison. That 3.5 year penalty breaks down into 1.5 years initial confinement (actual time in prison) and 2 years extended supervision.

As previously mentioned, urban counties, such as Milwaukee County, take a much harder stance on this charge than others. Frequently prosecutors will recommend prison as a part of the plea deal. They’ll also try to increase the penalties by adding other counts, typically including charges like recklessly endangering safety.

In more-rural counties, prosecutors may approach these charges less seriously, agreeing to a reduction from felony-level offenses. Probation is certainly a possibility depending on the circumstances. Certainly fleeing/eluding is also on the mitigated end when the version of the offense involves the defendant simply turning his lights off to elude.

What is fleeing and eluding Florida?

What Is a Fleeing and Eluding Charge in Florida? – Florida Statute § 316.1935 explains that fleeing and eluding takes place when a law enforcement officer directs a driver to pull over and they refuse or fail to stop the vehicle. Fleeing and eluding can also occur when the driver stops the vehicle and then flees in an attempt to evade the officer.

1. Given that the driver is trying to elude the police or law enforcement officer, driving at high speed or in a reckless manner is a common and aggravated element of fleeing and eluding in Florida.
2. According to the law, reckless driving consists of driving without looking after the safety of others or property.

Depending on the severity of the offense, a defendant could face a simple or an aggravated charge of fleeing and eluding in Florida. Aggravated fleeing and eluding occurs when the driver:

Caused injuries or death to another person;Caused property damage.

Aggravated fleeing and eluding charge in Florida is treated as a separate offense. In other words, if you were accused of aggravated fleeing and eluding, and left the scene of the accident, the prosecution could also file charges for hit and run,

What is the charge for fleeing and eluding in Michigan?

Potential Penalties for Fleeing & Eluding Michigan Police – Depending on the exact circumstances, you can be charged with a Class A, B, C, D, E, F, G, or H felony. Fleeing and eluding that does not lead to accidents, injuries, or deaths is often charged as a Class H felony, punishable by two years in prison, up to $2,000 in fines, and a license suspension,

1. When fleeing from the police leads to an accident, or you have a previous fleeing and eluding charge, you could face a Class E felony, punishable by up to five years in prison, fines, and a license suspension.
2. If an accident or chase leads to injuries, you may be imprisoned for up to 10 years due to a Class B or C felony conviction.

Prosecutors could charge you with a Class A felony if your actions resulted in someone’s death. Upon conviction, you could be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison along with additional penalties. In addition to these criminal penalties, there are countless other ways your personal and professional life could be affected if you are found guilty of fleeing and eluding in Michigan.

Trouble finding or keeping a good job Trouble finding affordable, safe housing Difficulty with child custody and visitation rights Loss of firearm rights Suspension of voting rights Immigration and citizenship issues Disqualification from federal financial aid Suspension or revocation of your professional license Following probation or parole requirements, including drug testing and curfews

These are just a few of the other ways your life could be affected by a conviction for fleeing and eluding the police. With consequences this severe, it’s critical that you get help defending yourself at trial. Don’t risk your freedom by relying on an overworked public defender to represent your interests in court.

What is the law for fleeing and eluding in PA?

(a) Offense defined. -Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to bring his vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police officer, when given a visual and audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, commits an offense as graded in subsection (a.2). (a.

How long do you go to jail for felony eluding in Oklahoma

Eluding and Endangering Others – Eluding an officer in a way that endangers any other person is a felony. The range of punishment in the Department of Corrections is 1-5 years. The range of fine is $1,000-$5,000.

What is the penal code for fleeing and eluding in Texas

PENAL CODE TITLE 8. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CHAPTER 38. OBSTRUCTING GOVERNMENTAL OPERATION Sec.38.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) “Custody” means: (A) under arrest by a peace officer or under restraint by a public servant pursuant to an order of a court of this state or another state of the United States; or (B) under restraint by an agent or employee of a facility that is operated by or under contract with the United States and that confines persons arrested for, charged with, or convicted of criminal offenses.

(2) “Escape” means unauthorized departure from custody or failure to return to custody following temporary leave for a specific purpose or limited period or leave that is part of an intermittent sentence, but does not include a violation of conditions of community supervision or parole other than conditions that impose a period of confinement in a secure correctional facility.

(3) “Economic benefit” means anything reasonably regarded as an economic gain or advantage, including accepting or offering to accept employment for a fee, accepting or offering to accept a fee, entering into a fee contract, or accepting or agreeing to accept money or anything of value.

1. 4) “Finance” means to provide funds or capital or to furnish with necessary funds.
2. 5) “Fugitive from justice” means a person for whom a valid arrest warrant has been issued.
3. 6) “Governmental function” includes any activity that a public servant is lawfully authorized to undertake on behalf of government.

(7) “Invest funds” means to commit money to earn a financial return. (8) “Member of the family” means anyone related within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, as determined under Chapter 573, Government Code. (9) “Qualified nonprofit organization” means a nonprofit organization that meets the following conditions: (A) the primary purposes of the organization do not include the rendition of legal services or education regarding legal services; (B) the recommending, furnishing, paying for, or educating persons regarding legal services is incidental and reasonably related to the primary purposes of the organization; (C) the organization does not derive a financial benefit from the rendition of legal services by a lawyer; and (D) the person for whom the legal services are rendered, and not the organization, is recognized as the client of a lawyer.

10) “Public media” means a telephone directory or legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, billboard or other sign, radio or television broadcast, recorded message the public may access by dialing a telephone number, or a written communication not prohibited by Section 38.12 (d). (11) “Solicit employment” means to communicate in person or by telephone with a prospective client or a member of the prospective client’s family concerning professional employment within the scope of a professional’s license, registration, or certification arising out of a particular occurrence or event, or series of occurrences or events, or concerning an existing problem of the prospective client within the scope of the professional’s license, registration, or certification, for the purpose of providing professional services to the prospective client, when neither the person receiving the communication nor anyone acting on that person’s behalf has requested the communication.

The term does not include a communication initiated by a family member of the person receiving a communication, a communication by a professional who has a prior or existing professional-client relationship with the person receiving the communication, or communication by an attorney for a qualified nonprofit organization with the organization’s members for the purpose of educating the organization’s members to understand the law, to recognize legal problems, to make intelligent selection of legal counsel, or to use available legal services.

1. The term does not include an advertisement by a professional through public media.
2. 12) “Professional” means an attorney, chiropractor, physician, surgeon, private investigator, or any other person licensed, certified, or registered by a state agency that regulates a health care profession.
3. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.883, ch.399, Sec.1, eff.

Jan.1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch.866, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1989; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch.14, Sec.284(14), eff. Sept.1, 1991; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch.561, Sec.42, eff. Aug.26, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.723, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff.

Sept.1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch.76, Sec.5.95(27), eff. Sept.1, 1995; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch.321, Sec.1.103, eff. Sept.1, 1995; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch.293, Sec.2, eff. Sept.1, 1997; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch.750, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1997. Sec.38.02. FAILURE TO IDENTIFY. (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to give his name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the information.

(b) A person commits an offense if he intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has: (1) lawfully arrested the person; (2) lawfully detained the person; or (3) requested the information from a person that the peace officer has good cause to believe is a witness to a criminal offense.

1. C) Except as provided by Subsections (d) and (e), an offense under this section is: (1) a Class C misdemeanor if the offense is committed under Subsection (a); or (2) a Class B misdemeanor if the offense is committed under Subsection (b).
2. D) If it is shown on the trial of an offense under this section that the defendant was a fugitive from justice at the time of the offense, the offense is: (1) a Class B misdemeanor if the offense is committed under Subsection (a); or (2) a Class A misdemeanor if the offense is committed under Subsection (b).

(e) If conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under Section 106.07, Alcoholic Beverage Code, the actor may be prosecuted only under Section 106.07, Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.883, ch.399, Sec.1, eff. Jan.1, 1974.

1. Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch.869, Sec.1, eff.
2. Sept.1, 1987.
3. Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch.821, Sec.1, eff.
4. Sept.1, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff.
5. Sept.1, 1994; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch.1009, Sec.1, eff.
6. Sept.1, 2003.
7. Sec.38.03.
8. RESISTING ARREST, SEARCH, OR TRANSPORTATION.
9. A) A person commits an offense if he intentionally prevents or obstructs a person he knows is a peace officer or a person acting in a peace officer’s presence and at his direction from effecting an arrest, search, or transportation of the actor or another by using force against the peace officer or another.

(b) It is no defense to prosecution under this section that the arrest or search was unlawful. (c) Except as provided in Subsection (d), an offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. (d) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if the actor uses a deadly weapon to resist the arrest or search.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.883, ch.399, Sec.1, eff. Jan.1, 1974. Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch.277, Sec.1, 2, eff. Sept.1, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff. Sept.1, 1994. Sec.38.04. EVADING ARREST OR DETENTION. (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer or federal special investigator attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.

Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch.839 (H.B.3423 ), Sec.4, and Ch.391, Sec.1 (b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is: (1) a state jail felony if: (A) the actor has been previously convicted under this section; or (B) the actor uses a vehicle or watercraft while the actor is in flight and the actor has not been previously convicted under this section; (2) a felony of the third degree if: (A) the actor uses a vehicle or watercraft while the actor is in flight and the actor has been previously convicted under this section; or (B) another suffers serious bodily injury as a direct result of an attempt by the officer or investigator from whom the actor is fleeing to apprehend the actor while the actor is in flight; or (3) a felony of the second degree if another suffers death as a direct result of an attempt by the officer or investigator from whom the actor is fleeing to apprehend the actor while the actor is in flight.

Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch.920 (S.B.1416 ), Sec.3 (b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is: (1) a state jail felony if the actor has been previously convicted under this section; (2) a felony of the third degree if: (A) the actor uses a vehicle while the actor is in flight; (B) another suffers serious bodily injury as a direct result of an attempt by the officer from whom the actor is fleeing to apprehend the actor while the actor is in flight; or (C) the actor uses a tire deflation device against the officer while the actor is in flight; or (3) a felony of the second degree if: (A) another suffers death as a direct result of an attempt by the officer from whom the actor is fleeing to apprehend the actor while the actor is in flight; or (B) another suffers serious bodily injury as a direct result of the actor’s use of a tire deflation device while the actor is in flight.

(c) In this section: (1) “Vehicle” has the meaning assigned by Section 541.201, Transportation Code. (2) “Tire deflation device” has the meaning assigned by Section 46.01, (3) “Watercraft” has the meaning assigned by Section 49.01, (d) A person who is subject to prosecution under both this section and another law may be prosecuted under either or both this section and the other law.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.883, ch.399, Sec.1, eff. Jan.1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch.504, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1987. Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch.126, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1989; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff. Sept.1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch.708, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1995; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch.165, Sec.30.240, eff.

Sept.1, 1997; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch.1334, Sec.3, eff. Sept.1, 2001; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch.1480, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 2001. Amended by: Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch.1400 (H.B.221 ), Sec.4, eff. September 1, 2009. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch.391 (S.B.496 ), Sec.1, eff.

September 1, 2011. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch.839 (H.B.3423 ), Sec.4, eff. September 1, 2011. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch.920 (S.B.1416 ), Sec.3, eff. September 1, 2011. Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch.161 (S.B.1093 ), Sec.22.001(38), eff. September 1, 2013. Sec.38.05. HINDERING APPREHENSION OR PROSECUTION.

(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to hinder the arrest, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for an offense or, with intent to hinder the arrest, detention, adjudication, or disposition of a child for engaging in delinquent conduct that violates a penal law of the state, or with intent to hinder the arrest of another under the authority of a warrant or capias, he: (1) harbors or conceals the other; (2) provides or aids in providing the other with any means of avoiding arrest or effecting escape; or (3) warns the other of impending discovery or apprehension.

(b) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a)(3) that the warning was given in connection with an effort to bring another into compliance with the law. (c) Except as provided by Subsection (d), an offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. (d) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if the person who is harbored, concealed, provided with a means of avoiding arrest or effecting escape, or warned of discovery or apprehension is under arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony, including an offense under Section 62.102, Code of Criminal Procedure, or is in custody or detention for, is alleged in a petition to have engaged in, or has been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct that violates a penal law of the grade of felony, including an offense under Section 62.102, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the person charged under this section knew that the person they harbored, concealed, provided with a means of avoiding arrest or effecting escape, or warned of discovery or apprehension is under arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony, or is in custody or detention for, is alleged in a petition to have engaged in, or has been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct that violates a penal law of the grade of felony.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.883, ch.399, Sec.1, eff. Jan.1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch.748, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1991; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff. Sept.1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch.318, Sec.11, eff. Sept.1, 1995. Amended by: Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch.607 (H.B.2104 ), Sec.1, eff.

September 1, 2005. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch.593 (H.B.8 ), Sec.1.19, eff. September 1, 2007. Sec.38.06. ESCAPE. (a) A person commits an offense if the person escapes from custody when the person is: (1) under arrest for, lawfully detained for, charged with, or convicted of an offense; (2) in custody pursuant to a lawful order of a court; (3) detained in a secure detention facility, as that term is defined by Section 51.02, Family Code; or (4) in the custody of a juvenile probation officer for violating an order imposed by the juvenile court under Section 52.01, Family Code.

(b) Except as provided in Subsections (c), (d), and (e), an offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. (c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if the actor: (1) is under arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony; (2) is confined or lawfully detained in a secure correctional facility or law enforcement facility; or (3) is committed to or lawfully detained in a secure correctional facility, as defined by Section 51.02, Family Code, other than a halfway house, operated by or under contract with the Texas Juvenile Justice Department.

1. D) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree if the actor to effect his escape causes bodily injury.
2. E) An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree if to effect his escape the actor: (1) causes serious bodily injury; or (2) uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.883, ch.399, Sec.1, eff. Jan.1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch.328, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1985. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec.38.07 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff. Sept.1, 1994. Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch.526, Sec.1, eff.

Sept.1, 1999. Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch.908 (H.B.2884 ), Sec.38, eff. September 1, 2007. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch.1330 (S.B.844 ), Sec.1, eff. September 1, 2011. Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch.734 (H.B.1549 ), Sec.143, eff. September 1, 2015. Sec.38.07. PERMITTING OR FACILITATING ESCAPE.

(a) An official or employee of a correctional facility commits an offense if he knowingly permits or facilitates the escape of a person in custody. (b) A person commits an offense if he knowingly causes or facilitates the escape of one who is in custody pursuant to: (1) an allegation or adjudication of delinquency; or (2) involuntary commitment for mental illness under Subtitle C, Title 7, Health and Safety Code, or for chemical dependency under Chapter 462, Health and Safety Code.

• C) Except as provided in Subsections (d) and (e), an offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
• D) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if the person in custody: (1) was under arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony; or (2) was confined in a correctional facility other than a secure correctional facility after conviction of a felony.

(e) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree if: (1) the actor or the person in custody used or threatened to use a deadly weapon to effect the escape; or (2) the person in custody was confined in a secure correctional facility after conviction of a felony.

(f) In this section, “correctional facility” means: (1) any place described by Section 1.07 (a)(14); or (2) a “secure correctional facility” or “secure detention facility” as those terms are defined by Section 51.02, Family Code. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.883, ch.399, Sec.1, eff. Jan.1, 1974. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec.38.08 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff.

Sept.1, 1994. Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch.908 (H.B.2884 ), Sec.39, eff. September 1, 2007. Sec.38.08. EFFECT OF UNLAWFUL CUSTODY. It is no defense to prosecution under Section 38.06 or 38.07 that the custody was unlawful. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.883, ch.399, Sec.1, eff.

Jan.1, 1974. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec.38.09 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff. Sept.1, 1994. Sec.38.09. IMPLEMENTS FOR ESCAPE. (a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to facilitate escape, he introduces into a correctional facility, or provides a person in custody or an inmate with, a deadly weapon or anything that may be useful for escape.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree unless the actor introduced or provided a deadly weapon, in which event the offense is a felony of the second degree. (c) In this section, “correctional facility” means: (1) any place described by Section 1.07 (a)(14); or (2) a “secure correctional facility” or “secure detention facility” as those terms are defined by Section 51.02, Family Code.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.883, ch.399, Sec.1, eff. Jan.1, 1974. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec.38.10 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff. Sept.1, 1994. Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch.908 (H.B.2884 ), Sec.40, eff. September 1, 2007. Sec.38.10. BAIL JUMPING AND FAILURE TO APPEAR.

(a) A person lawfully released from custody, with or without bail, on condition that he subsequently appear commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly fails to appear in accordance with the terms of his release. (b) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the appearance was incident to community supervision, parole, or an intermittent sentence.

(c) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the actor had a reasonable excuse for his failure to appear in accordance with the terms of his release. (d) Except as provided in Subsections (e) and (f), an offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. (e) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor if the offense for which the actor’s appearance was required is punishable by fine only.

(f) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if the offense for which the actor’s appearance was required is classified as a felony. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.883, ch.399, Sec.1, eff. Jan.1, 1974. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec.38.11 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff.

Sept.1, 1994. Sec.38.11. PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES AND ITEMS IN CORRECTIONAL OR CIVIL COMMITMENT FACILITY. (a) A person commits an offense if the person provides, or possesses with the intent to provide: (1) an alcoholic beverage, controlled substance, or dangerous drug to a person in the custody of a correctional facility or civil commitment facility, except on the prescription of a practitioner; (2) a deadly weapon to a person in the custody of a correctional facility or civil commitment facility; (3) a cellular telephone or other wireless communications device or a component of one of those devices to a person in the custody of a correctional facility; (4) money to a person confined in a correctional facility; or (5) a cigarette or tobacco product to a person confined in a correctional facility, except that if the facility is a local jail regulated by the Commission on Jail Standards, the person commits an offense only if providing the cigarette or tobacco product violates a rule or regulation adopted by the sheriff or jail administrator that: (A) prohibits the possession of a cigarette or tobacco product by a person confined in the jail; or (B) places restrictions on: (i) the possession of a cigarette or tobacco product by a person confined in the jail; or (ii) the manner in which a cigarette or tobacco product may be provided to a person confined in the jail.

(b) A person commits an offense if the person takes an alcoholic beverage, controlled substance, or dangerous drug into a correctional facility or civil commitment facility. (c) A person commits an offense if the person takes a controlled substance or dangerous drug on property owned, used, or controlled by a correctional facility or civil commitment facility.

(d) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) possesses a controlled substance or dangerous drug while in a correctional facility or civil commitment facility or on property owned, used, or controlled by a correctional facility or civil commitment facility; or (2) possesses a deadly weapon while in a correctional facility or civil commitment facility.

(e) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under Subsection (b), (c), or (d)(1) that the person possessed the alcoholic beverage, controlled substance, or dangerous drug pursuant to a prescription issued by a practitioner or while delivering the beverage, substance, or drug to a warehouse, pharmacy, or practitioner on property owned, used, or controlled by the correctional facility or civil commitment facility.

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under Subsection (d)(2) that the person possessing the deadly weapon is a peace officer or is an officer or employee of the correctional facility or civil commitment facility who is authorized to possess the deadly weapon while on duty or traveling to or from the person’s place of assignment.

(f) In this section: (1) “Practitioner” has the meaning assigned by Section 481.002, Health and Safety Code. (2) “Prescription” has the meaning assigned by Section 481.002, Health and Safety Code. (3) “Cigarette” has the meaning assigned by Section 154.001, Tax Code.

(4) “Tobacco product” has the meaning assigned by Section 155.001, Tax Code. (5) “Component” means any item necessary for the current, ongoing, or future operation of a cellular telephone or other wireless communications device, including a subscriber identity module card or functionally equivalent portable memory chip, a battery or battery charger, and any number of minutes that have been purchased or for which a contract has been entered into and during which a cellular telephone or other wireless communications device is capable of transmitting or receiving communications.

(6) “Correctional facility” means: (A) any place described by Section 1.07 (a)(14)(A), (B), or (C); or (B) a secure correctional facility or secure detention facility, as defined by Section 51.02, Family Code. (g) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.

• H) Notwithstanding Section 15.01 (d), if a person commits the offense of criminal attempt to commit an offense under Subsection (a), (b), or (c), the offense committed under Section 15.01 is a felony of the third degree.
• I) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under Subsection (b) that the actor: (1) is a duly authorized member of the clergy with rights and privileges granted by an ordaining authority that includes administration of a religious ritual or ceremony requiring the presence or consumption of an alcoholic beverage; and (2) takes four ounces or less of an alcoholic beverage into a correctional facility and personally consumes all of the alcoholic beverage or departs from the facility with any portion of the beverage not consumed.

(j) A person commits an offense if the person, while confined in a correctional facility, possesses a cellular telephone or other wireless communications device or a component of one of those devices. (k) A person commits an offense if, with the intent to provide to or make a cellular telephone or other wireless communications device or a component of one of those devices available for use by a person in the custody of a correctional facility, the person: (1) acquires a cellular telephone or other wireless communications device or a component of one of those devices to be delivered to the person in custody; (2) provides a cellular telephone or other wireless communications device or a component of one of those devices to another person for delivery to the person in custody; or (3) makes a payment to a communication common carrier, as defined by Article 18A.001, Code of Criminal Procedure, or to any communication service that provides to its users the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.

Added by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., 2nd C.S., ch.10, Sec.5.01, eff. Oct.1, 1991. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec.38.112 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff. Sept.1, 1994. Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch.362, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1999; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch.649, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1999; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch.470, Sec.1 to 3, eff.

Sept.1, 2003. Amended by: Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch.499 (H.B.549 ), Sec.1, eff. June 17, 2005. Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch.949 (H.B.1575 ), Sec.48, eff. September 1, 2005. Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch.1092 (H.B.2077 ), Sec.1, eff. September 1, 2005. Reenacted and amended by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch.1169 (H.B.3228 ), Sec.1, eff.

September 1, 2009. Amended by: Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch.34 (S.B.1576 ), Sec.30, eff. September 1, 2017. Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch.34 (S.B.1576 ), Sec.31, eff. September 1, 2017. Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch.1058 (H.B.2931 ), Sec.3.19, eff. January 1, 2019. Sec.38.111. IMPROPER CONTACT WITH VICTIM.

(a) A person commits an offense if the person, while confined in a correctional facility after being charged with or convicted of an offense listed in Article 62.001 (5), Code of Criminal Procedure, contacts by letter, telephone, or any other means, either directly or through a third party, a victim of the offense or a member of the victim’s family, if the director of the correctional facility has not, before the person makes contact with the victim: (1) received written and dated consent to the contact from: (A) the victim, if the victim was 17 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense for which the person is confined; or (B) if the victim was younger than 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the person is confined: (i) a parent of the victim; (ii) a legal guardian of the victim; (iii) the victim, if the victim is 17 years of age or older at the time of giving the consent; or (iv) a member of the victim’s family who is 17 years of age or older; and (2) provided the person with a copy of the consent.

B) The person confined in a correctional facility may not give the written consent required under Subsection (a)(2)(A). (c) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the contact was: (1) indirect contact made through an attorney representing the person in custody; and (2) solely for the purpose of representing the person in a criminal proceeding.

(d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor unless the actor is confined in a correctional facility after being convicted of a felony described by Subsection (a), in which event the offense is a felony of the third degree. (e) In this section, “correctional facility” means: (1) any place described by Section 1.07 (a)(14); or (2) a “secure correctional facility” or “secure detention facility” as those terms are defined by Section 51.02, Family Code.

Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch.1337, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 2001. Amended by: Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch.1008 (H.B.867 ), Sec.2.11, eff. September 1, 2005. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch.908 (H.B.2884 ), Sec.41, eff. September 1, 2007. Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch.1066 (H.B.1343 ), Sec.5, eff. September 1, 2019.

Sec.38.113. UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE FROM COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS FACILITY, COUNTY CORRECTIONAL CENTER, OR ASSIGNMENT SITE. (a) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) is sentenced to or is required as a condition of community supervision or correctional programming to submit to a period of detention or treatment in a community corrections facility or county correctional center; (2) fails to report to or leaves the facility, the center, or a community service assignment site as directed by the court, community supervision and corrections department supervising the person, or director of the facility or center in which the person is detained or treated, as appropriate; and (3) in failing to report or leaving acts without the approval of the court, the community supervision and corrections department supervising the person, or the director of the facility or center in which the person is detained or treated.

• B) An offense under this section is a state jail felony.
• Added by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff.
• Sept.1, 1994.
• Amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch.318, Sec.12, eff.
• Sept.1, 1995.
• Sec.38.114.
• CONTRABAND IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY.
• A) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) provides contraband to an inmate of a correctional facility; (2) otherwise introduces contraband into a correctional facility; or (3) possesses contraband while confined in a correctional facility.

(b) In this section, “contraband”: (1) means: (A) any item not provided by or authorized by the operator of the correctional facility; or (B) any item provided by or authorized by the operator of the correctional facility that has been altered to accommodate a use other than the originally intended use; and (2) does not include any item specifically prohibited under Section 38.11,

(c) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor, unless the offense is committed by an employee or a volunteer of the correctional facility, in which event the offense is a Class B misdemeanor. (d) In this section, “correctional facility” means: (1) any place described by Section 1.07 (a)(14); or (2) a “secure correctional facility” or “secure detention facility” as those terms are defined by Section 51.02, Family Code.

Added by Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch.499 (H.B.549 ), Sec.2, eff. June 17, 2005. Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch.908 (H.B.2884 ), Sec.42, eff. September 1, 2007. Sec.38.12. BARRATRY AND SOLICITATION OF PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT. (a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain an economic benefit the person: (1) knowingly institutes a suit or claim that the person has not been authorized to pursue; (2) solicits employment, either in person or by telephone, for himself or for another; (3) pays, gives, or advances or offers to pay, give, or advance to a prospective client money or anything of value to obtain employment as a professional from the prospective client; (4) pays or gives or offers to pay or give a person money or anything of value to solicit employment; (5) pays or gives or offers to pay or give a family member of a prospective client money or anything of value to solicit employment; or (6) accepts or agrees to accept money or anything of value to solicit employment.

B) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) knowingly finances the commission of an offense under Subsection (a); (2) invests funds the person knows or believes are intended to further the commission of an offense under Subsection (a); or (3) is a professional who knowingly accepts employment within the scope of the person’s license, registration, or certification that results from the solicitation of employment in violation of Subsection (a).

(c) It is an exception to prosecution under Subsection (a) or (b) that the person’s conduct is authorized by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct or any rule of court. (d) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) is an attorney, chiropractor, physician, surgeon, or private investigator licensed to practice in this state or any person licensed, certified, or registered by a health care regulatory agency of this state; and (2) with the intent to obtain professional employment for the person or for another, provides or knowingly permits to be provided to an individual who has not sought the person’s employment, legal representation, advice, or care a written communication or a solicitation, including a solicitation in person or by telephone, that: (A) concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication or solicitation is provided or a relative of that person and that was provided before the 31st day after the date on which the accident or disaster occurred; (B) concerns a specific matter and relates to legal representation and the person knows or reasonably should know that the person to whom the communication or solicitation is directed is represented by a lawyer in the matter; (C) concerns a lawsuit of any kind, including an action for divorce, in which the person to whom the communication or solicitation is provided is a defendant or a relative of that person, unless the lawsuit in which the person is named as a defendant has been on file for more than 31 days before the date on which the communication or solicitation was provided; (D) is provided or permitted to be provided by a person who knows or reasonably should know that the injured person or relative of the injured person has indicated a desire not to be contacted by or receive communications or solicitations concerning employment; (E) involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation, or undue influence; or (F) contains a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or unfair statement or claim.

• E) For purposes of Subsection (d)(2)(D), a desire not to be contacted is presumed if an accident report reflects that such an indication has been made by an injured person or that person’s relative.
• F) An offense under Subsection (a) or (b) is a felony of the third degree.
• G) Except as provided by Subsection (h), an offense under Subsection (d) is a Class A misdemeanor.

(h) An offense under Subsection (d) is a felony of the third degree if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has previously been convicted under Subsection (d). (i) Final conviction of felony barratry is a serious crime for all purposes and acts, specifically including the State Bar Rules and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.883, ch.399, Sec.1, eff. Jan.1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch.866, Sec.2, eff. Sept.1, 1989; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.723, Sec.2, eff. Sept.1, 1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff. Sept.1, 1994; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch.750, Sec.2, eff. Sept.1, 1997. Amended by: Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch.1252 (H.B.148 ), Sec.1, eff.

September 1, 2009. Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch.315 (H.B.1711 ), Sec.3, eff. September 1, 2013. Sec.38.122. FALSELY HOLDING ONESELF OUT AS A LAWYER. (a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain an economic benefit for himself or herself, the person holds himself or herself out as a lawyer, unless he or she is currently licensed to practice law in this state, another state, or a foreign country and is in good standing with the State Bar of Texas and the state bar or licensing authority of any and all other states and foreign countries where licensed.

B) An offense under Subsection (a) of this section is a felony of the third degree. (c) Final conviction of falsely holding oneself out to be a lawyer is a serious crime for all purposes and acts, specifically including the State Bar Rules. Added by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.723, Sec.5, eff. Sept.1, 1993.

Sec.38.123. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. (a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain an economic benefit for himself or herself, the person: (1) contracts with any person to represent that person with regard to personal causes of action for property damages or personal injury; (2) advises any person as to the person’s rights and the advisability of making claims for personal injuries or property damages; (3) advises any person as to whether or not to accept an offered sum of money in settlement of claims for personal injuries or property damages; (4) enters into any contract with another person to represent that person in personal injury or property damage matters on a contingent fee basis with an attempted assignment of a portion of the person’s cause of action; or (5) enters into any contract with a third person which purports to grant the exclusive right to select and retain legal counsel to represent the individual in any legal proceeding.

(b) This section does not apply to a person currently licensed to practice law in this state, another state, or a foreign country and in good standing with the State Bar of Texas and the state bar or licensing authority of any and all other states and foreign countries where licensed. (c) Except as provided by Subsection (d) of this section, an offense under Subsection (a) of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

(d) An offense under Subsection (a) of this section is a felony of the third degree if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has previously been convicted under Subsection (a) of this section. Added by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.723, Sec.5, eff.

1. Sept.1, 1993.
2. Sec.38.13.
3. HINDERING PROCEEDINGS BY DISORDERLY CONDUCT.
4. A) A person commits an offense if he intentionally hinders an official proceeding by noise or violent or tumultuous behavior or disturbance.
5. B) A person commits an offense if he recklessly hinders an official proceeding by noise or violent or tumultuous behavior or disturbance and continues after explicit official request to desist.

(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Added by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.833, ch.399, Sec.1, eff. Jan.1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff. Sept.1, 1994. Sec.38.14. TAKING OR ATTEMPTING TO TAKE WEAPON FROM PEACE OFFICER, FEDERAL SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR, EMPLOYEE OR OFFICIAL OF CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, PAROLE OFFICER, COMMUNITY SUPERVISION AND CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT OFFICER, OR COMMISSIONED SECURITY OFFICER.

1. A) In this section: (1) “Firearm” has the meanings assigned by Section 46.01,
2. 2) “Stun gun” means a device designed to propel darts or other projectiles attached to wires that, on contact, will deliver an electrical pulse capable of incapacitating a person.
3. 3) “Commissioned security officer” has the meaning assigned by Section 1702.002 (5), Occupations Code.

(b) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly and with force takes or attempts to take from a peace officer, federal special investigator, employee or official of a correctional facility, parole officer, community supervision and corrections department officer, or commissioned security officer the officer’s, investigator’s, employee’s, or official’s firearm, nightstick, stun gun, or personal protection chemical dispensing device.

(c) The actor is presumed to have known that the peace officer, federal special investigator, employee or official of a correctional facility, parole officer, community supervision and corrections department officer, or commissioned security officer was a peace officer, federal special investigator, employee or official of a correctional facility, parole officer, community supervision and corrections department officer, or commissioned security officer if: (1) the officer, investigator, employee, or official was wearing a distinctive uniform or badge indicating his employment; or (2) the officer, investigator, employee, or official identified himself as a peace officer, federal special investigator, employee or official of a correctional facility, parole officer, community supervision and corrections department officer, or commissioned security officer.

(d) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the defendant took or attempted to take the weapon from a peace officer, federal special investigator, employee or official of a correctional facility, parole officer, community supervision and corrections department officer, or commissioned security officer who was using force against the defendant or another in excess of the amount of force permitted by law.

(e) An offense under this section is: (1) a felony of the third degree, if the defendant took a weapon described by Subsection (b) from an officer, investigator, employee, or official described by that subsection; and (2) a state jail felony, if the defendant attempted to take a weapon described by Subsection (b) from an officer, investigator, employee, or official described by that subsection.

Added by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch.986, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1989. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec.38.16 by Acts 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch.12, Sec.2(25), eff. Sept.6, 1990. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec.38.17 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff.

Sept.1, 1994. Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch.714, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1999; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch.322, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 2001. Amended by: Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch.1201 (H.B.582 ), Sec.1, eff. September 1, 2005. Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch.394 (H.B.1721 ), Sec.2, eff. September 1, 2009. Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch.942 (H.B.3147 ), Sec.1, eff.

September 1, 2009. Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch.942 (H.B.3147 ), Sec.2, eff. September 1, 2009. Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch.942 (H.B.3147 ), Sec.3, eff. September 1, 2009. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch.839 (H.B.3423 ), Sec.5, eff. September 1, 2011. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch.839 (H.B.3423 ), Sec.6, eff.

September 1, 2011. Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch.647 (S.B.1754 ), Sec.1, eff. September 1, 2019. Sec.38.15. INTERFERENCE WITH PUBLIC DUTIES. (a) A person commits an offense if the person with criminal negligence interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes with: (1) a peace officer while the peace officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law; (2) a person who is employed to provide emergency medical services including the transportation of ill or injured persons while the person is performing that duty; (3) a fire fighter, while the fire fighter is fighting a fire or investigating the cause of a fire; (4) an animal under the supervision of a peace officer, corrections officer, or jailer, if the person knows the animal is being used for law enforcement, corrections, prison or jail security, or investigative purposes; (5) the transmission of a communication over a citizen’s band radio channel, the purpose of which communication is to inform or inquire about an emergency; (6) an officer with responsibility for animal control in a county or municipality, while the officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted under Chapter 821 or 822, Health and Safety Code; or (7) a person who: (A) has responsibility for assessing, enacting, or enforcing public health, environmental, radiation, or safety measures for the state or a county or municipality; (B) is investigating a particular site as part of the person’s responsibilities under Paragraph (A); (C) is acting in accordance with policies and procedures related to the safety and security of the site described by Paragraph (B); and (D) is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted under the Agriculture Code, Health and Safety Code, Occupations Code, or Water Code.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor. (c) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a)(1) that the conduct engaged in by the defendant was intended to warn a person operating a motor vehicle of the presence of a peace officer who was enforcing Subtitle C, Title 7, Transportation Code.

• D) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the interruption, disruption, impediment, or interference alleged consisted of speech only.
• D-1) Except as provided by Subsection (d-2), in a prosecution for an offense under Subsection (a)(1), there is a rebuttable presumption that the actor interferes with a peace officer if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the actor intentionally disseminated the home address, home telephone number, emergency contact information, or social security number of the officer or a family member of the officer or any other information that is specifically described by Section 552.117 (a), Government Code.

(d-2) The presumption in Subsection (d-1) does not apply to information disseminated by: (1) a radio or television station that holds a license issued by the Federal Communications Commission; or (2) a newspaper that is: (A) a free newspaper of general circulation or qualified to publish legal notices; (B) published at least once a week; and (C) available and of interest to the general public.

(e) In this section, “emergency” means a condition or circumstance in which an individual is or is reasonably believed by the person transmitting the communication to be in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or in which property is or is reasonably believed by the person transmitting the communication to be in imminent danger of damage or destruction.

Added by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch.1162, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1989. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec.38.16 by Acts 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch.12, Sec.2(26), eff. Sept.6, 1990. Renumbered from Penal Code Sec.38.18 and amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch.900, Sec.1.01, eff.

Sept.1, 1994. Amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch.165, Sec.30.241, eff. Sept.1, 1997. Amended by: Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch.1212 (H.B.825 ), Sec.1, eff. September 1, 2005. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch.1251 (H.B.2703 ), Sec.1, eff. September 1, 2007. Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch.519 (H.B.1061 ), Sec.1, eff.

September 1, 2015. Sec.38.151. INTERFERENCE WITH POLICE SERVICE ANIMALS. (a) In this section: (1) “Area of control” includes a vehicle, trailer, kennel, pen, or yard. (2) “Handler or rider” means a peace officer, corrections officer, or jailer who is specially trained to use a police service animal for law enforcement, corrections, prison or jail security, or investigative purposes.

1. 3) “Police service animal” means a dog, horse, or other domesticated animal that is specially trained for use by a handler or rider.
2. B) A person commits an offense if the person recklessly: (1) taunts, torments, or strikes a police service animal; (2) throws an object or substance at a police service animal; (3) interferes with or obstructs a police service animal or interferes with or obstructs the handler or rider of a police service animal in a manner that: (A) inhibits or restricts the handler’s or rider’s control of the animal; or (B) deprives the handler or rider of control of the animal; (4) releases a police service animal from its area of control; (5) enters the area of control of a police service animal without the effective consent of the handler or rider, including placing food or any other object or substance into that area; (6) injures or kills a police service animal; or (7) engages in conduct likely to injure or kill a police service animal, including administering or setting a poison, trap, or any other object or substance.

(c) An offense under this section is: (1) a Class C misdemeanor if the person commits an offense under Subsection (b)(1); (2) a Class B misdemeanor if the person commits an offense under Subsection (b)(2); (3) a Class A misdemeanor if the person commits an offense under Subsection (b)(3), (4), or (5); (4) except as provided by Subdivision (5), a state jail felony if the person commits an offense under Subsection (b)(6) or (7) by injuring a police service animal or by engaging in conduct likely to injure the animal; or (5) a felony of the second degree if the person commits an offense under Subsection (b)(6) or (7) by: (A) killing a police service animal or engaging in conduct likely to kill the animal; (B) injuring a police service animal in a manner that materially and permanently affects the ability of the animal to perform as a police service animal; or (C) engaging in conduct likely to injure a police service animal in a manner that would materially and permanently affect the ability of the animal to perform as a police service animal.

• Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch.979, Sec.1, eff.
• Sept.1, 2001.
• Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch.1331 (S.B.1562 ), Sec.5, eff.
• September 1, 2007.
• Sec.38.152.
• INTERFERENCE WITH RADIO FREQUENCY LICENSED TO GOVERNMENT ENTITY.
• A) A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the law enforcement agency, fire department, or emergency medical services provider, the person intentionally interrupts, disrupts, impedes, jams, or otherwise interferes with a radio frequency that is licensed by the Federal Communications Commission to a government entity and is used by the law enforcement agency, fire department, or emergency medical services provider.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is a state jail felony if the actor committed the offense with the intent to: (1) facilitate the commission of another offense; or (2) interfere with the ability of a law enforcement agency, a fire department, or an emergency medical services provider to respond to an emergency.

• C) In this section: (1) “Emergency” has the meaning assigned by Section 38.15,
• 2) “Emergency medical services provider” has the meaning assigned by Section 773.003, Health and Safety Code.
• 3) “Law enforcement agency” has the meaning assigned by Article 59.01, Code of Criminal Procedure.
• D) If conduct constituting an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under another section of this code, the actor may be prosecuted under either section or under both sections.

Added by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch.1222 (S.B.1273 ), Sec.1, eff. September 1, 2009. Sec.38.16. PREVENTING EXECUTION OF CIVIL PROCESS. (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly by words or physical action prevents the execution of any process in a civil cause.

B) It is an exception to the application of this section that the actor evaded service of process by avoiding detection. (c) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor. Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch.318, Sec.13, eff. Sept.1, 1995. Sec.38.17. FAILURE TO STOP OR REPORT AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILD.

(a) A person, other than a person who has a relationship with a child described by Section 22.04 (b), commits an offense if: (1) the actor observes the commission or attempted commission of an offense prohibited by Section 21.02 or 22.021 (a)(2)(B) under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that an offense of a sexual or assaultive nature was being committed or was about to be committed against the child; (2) the actor fails to assist the child or immediately report the commission of the offense to a peace officer or law enforcement agency; and (3) the actor could assist the child or immediately report the commission of the offense without placing the actor in danger of suffering serious bodily injury or death.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch.1344, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 1999. Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch.593 (H.B.8 ), Sec.3.50, eff. September 1, 2007. Sec.38.171. FAILURE TO REPORT FELONY. (a) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) observes the commission of a felony under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that an offense had been committed in which serious bodily injury or death may have resulted; and (2) fails to immediately report the commission of the offense to a peace officer or law enforcement agency under circumstances in which: (A) a reasonable person would believe that the commission of the offense had not been reported; and (B) the person could immediately report the commission of the offense without placing himself or herself in danger of suffering serious bodily injury or death.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch.1009, Sec.2, eff. Sept.1, 2003. Sec.38.18. USE OF ACCIDENT REPORT INFORMATION AND OTHER INFORMATION FOR PECUNIARY GAIN. (a) This section applies to: (1) information described by Section 550.065 (a), Transportation Code; (2) information reported under Chapter 772, Health and Safety Code, other than information that is confidential under that chapter; and (3) information contained in a dispatch log, a towing record, or a record of a 9-1-1 service provider, other than information that is confidential under Chapter 772, Health and Safety Code.

(b) A person commits an offense if: (1) the person obtains information described by Subsection (a) from the Department of Public Safety of the State of Texas or other governmental entity; and (2) the information is subsequently used for the direct solicitation of business or employment for pecuniary gain by: (A) the person; (B) an agent or employee of the person; or (C) the person on whose behalf the information was requested.

(c) A person who employs or engages another to obtain information described by Subsection (a) from the Department of Public Safety or other governmental entity commits an offense if the person subsequently uses the information for direct solicitation of business or employment for pecuniary gain.

(d) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor. Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch.1032, Sec.1, eff. Sept.1, 2001. Sec.38.19. FAILURE TO PROVIDE NOTICE AND REPORT OF DEATH OF RESIDENT OF INSTITUTION. (a) A superintendent or general manager of an institution commits an offense if, as required by Article 49.24 or 49.25, Code of Criminal Procedure, the person fails to: (1) provide notice of the death of an individual under the care, custody, or control of or residing in the institution; (2) submit a report on the death of the individual; or (3) include in the report material facts known or discovered by the person at the time the report was filed.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor. Added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch.894, Sec.4, eff. Sept.1, 2003.

Does Georgia extradite for felonies?

EXTRADITION IN GEORGIA You’ve spent four days in county jail for public intoxication. It’s a minor, first-time offense for you. And, luckily, on your court date the prosecutor is in a good mood and agrees to time served and a fine. You’ll still have to plead guilty and have a conviction on your record, but you’re going homeso you think.

1. Just as you plead guilty to the public intoxication offense, the judge’s clerk announces that he’s just found an out-of-state warrant for your arrest in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database.
2. You’re wanted in Alabama for a crime you don’t even remember committing.
3. You’re a fugitive! Now, you’re wondering what’s next? Is the judge going to hold you or let you out on bond? OUT-OF-STATE WARRANTS & EXTRADITION IN GEORGIA Just as an arrest warrant, an out-of-state (fugitive) warrant is an official court document issued by a judge or magistrate that allows for law enforcement officials to arrest an individual who is accused of committing a crime and to be taken into police custody.

An out-of-state warrant, of course, is issued in a state that is different from where you reside and/or are arrested. As in-state warrants, out-of-state warrants requires law enforcement to have probable cause that a person committed a crime. If the out-of-state warrant is granted, the warrant information is entered into local and national law enforcement databases.

• This means that an arrest warrant that is issued in Alabama may be viewed by law enforcement officials in Georgia.
• The out-of-state arrest warrant will typically contain details about the crime and a description of the individual accused of committing the crime.
• Further, if a valid out-of-state arrest warrant is issued for your arrest, you may be arrested at any time and in any location and returned to the state where the crime was committed—known as the process of extradition.

Extradition is the formal process by which a fugitive arrested in one state (the asylum state) on an extradition warrant is surrendered to another state (the demanding state) for trial or punishment. Under Georgia’s Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, it is the duty of the Governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state.O.C.G.A.

• §17-13-22.
• If the Governor decides that the demand should be complied with, he shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the seal of the office of the Governor and directed to any peace officer or other person whom he may think fit to entrust with the execution thereof.
• The warrant must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance.O.C.G.A.

§17-13-27. DEMAND FOR EXTRADITION Under O.C.G.A. §17-13-23, no demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another state shall be recognized by the Governor unless in writing, alleging that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that thereafter he fled from the state, and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found, or by information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon, or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation, or parole.

The indictment, information, or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of the state; and the copy of the indictment, information, affidavit, judgment of conviction, or sentence must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand.

MANNER & PLACE OF EXECUTION OF WARRANT The warrant shall authorize the peace officer or other person to whom directed to arrest the accused at any time and any place where he may be found within the state, to command the aid of all peace officers or other persons in the execution of the warrant, and to deliver the accused, subject to other provisions of this article, to the duly authorized agent of the demanding state.O.C.G.A.

• §17-13-28.
• RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS & HEARING No person arrested upon a warrant shall be delivered over to the agent whom the executive authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive him unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record in this state, who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender, of the crime with which he is charged, and that he has the right to demand and procure legal counsel.

If the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he or they desire to test the legality of his arrest, the judge of the court of record shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed him within which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. When the writ is applied for, notice thereof, and of the time and place of hearing thereon, shall be given to the prosecuting officer of the county in which the arrest is made and in which the accused is in custody and to the agent of the demanding state.O.C.G.A.

§17-13-30. The district attorney shall answer and defend any habeas corpus action brought under this article, which action contests the issuance, execution, or validity of a Governor’s warrant of arrest, unless the Governor shall direct the Attorney General to answer and defend the habeas corpus action.O.C.G.A.

§17-13-31. GRANTING OF BAIL Unless the offense with which the prisoner is charged is shown to be an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment under the laws of the state in which it was committed, a judge or magistrate in this state may admit the prisoner to bail by bond, with sufficient sureties, in such sum as he deems proper, conditioned for the prisoner’s appearance before the judge or magistrate at a time specified in such bond and for the prisoner’s surrender to be arrested upon the warrant of the Governor of this state.O.C.G.A.

§17-13-31. WHY DO YOU NEED AN ATTORNEY IN AN EXTRADITION CASE? One of the main reasons why an individual arrested on an extradition/out-of-state/fugitive warrant may want an attorney is because they may not know all of the options available to them after they are arrested. A person arrested on a fugitive warrant may: (1) Consent to the extradition; (2) Request an extradition bond; or, (3) Request an extradition hearing.

In the majority of cases, most people do consent to extradition, which means they sign a written Waiver of Extradition Proceedings because successfully challenging an extradition is not always easy and an individual would more than likely be transported back to the demanding state before his or her extradition hearing.

1. The next option is an extradition bond, which allows a person to post a bail-bond conditioned on an agreement that he or she will appear at all future court proceedings regarding the extradition request.
2. An extradition bond is a way of avoiding incarceration pending extradition and requires convincing a judge in the asylum state to let the defendant out on bond.

Most defendants seeking an extradition bond acknowledge the validity of the fugitive warrant and are willing to travel to the demanding state to surrender. Moreover, before a person is extradited, certain requirements must be met under the law and usually at an extradition hearing:

An arrest warrant issued by another state (the demanding state).The demanding state produces a sworn charging document alleging a criminal offense.The sworn documents provide sufficient information identifying the arrested person as the actual fugitive.The demanding state must retrieve the fugitive within thirty days from time of arrest or the fugitive will be released (some states allow up to 90 days before they will release a fugitive).

EXTRADITION DEFENSES There are some defenses available to contest an extradition. Two defenses include proving that the demanding state has provided: (1) Insufficient Documentation; or, (2) Insufficient Identification. An extradition may be challenged if the details of the warrant are insufficient or if it can be proved that the accused is not the subject of the fugitive warrant.

Usually, if such defenses are sufficiently raised, then the asylum state judge will either release the defendant (with or without bond) or continue the extradition hearing out to a future date to allow the demanding state time to correct the inaccurate information. CONTACT BIXON LAW TODAY Have you been arrested on an out-of-state/extradtion/fugitive warrant in Georgia? If so, call Bixon Law today.

We can help you with challenging the extradition proceeding or obtaining an extradition bond. You need an experienced Georgia criminal defense lawyer on your side who will defend your legal rights and vigorously advocate on your behalf to have your case dismissed or the charges against you reduced.

As experienced trial attorneys, we are also not afraid to take your case to trial if necessary. We represent clients in Atlanta and throughout the state of Georgia. We are lawyers who are committed to helping people in difficult situations and we invite you to call us at 404-551-5684 for a free consultation today.

: EXTRADITION IN GEORGIA

What is reckless driving in Georgia

OCGA Reckless Driving Charge in GA Is a Serious Driving Offense – Comparing reckless driving vs DUI Georgia cases. First, every DUI in GA results in driver’s license suspension, whereas only drivers under age 21 who are convicted of RD face a license suspension.

1. Second, because a DUI stays on your record for life, and can continuously “pop up” in job searches and other important future opportunities.
2. What if it is my reckless driving first offense? Some accused drivers cannot have a reckless driving misdemeanor conviction either.
3. Some CMV (commercial motor vehicle) operators can lose their jobs from a 1st offense reckless driving.

Hence, hiring an aggressive traffic ticket lawyer for your case and trying to avoid a reckless driving conviction is worthwhile. The reckless driving GA code. Below is the statutory wording on the reckless driving GA statute, under O.C.G.A.40-6-390:

Any person who drives any vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property commits the offense of reckless driving. Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000.00 or imprisonment not to exceed 12 months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, provided that no provision of this Code section shall be construed so as to deprive the court imposing the sentence of the power given by law to stay or suspend the execution of such sentence or to place the defendant on probation.

How much is a ticket for driving without a license in Georgia?

Georgia Has Strict Laws Regarding Driving Without a License – Georgia law considers it a violation if any person drives without a valid license, whether they never had a license or had one suspended. The penalty for driving without a license in Georgia begins with a misdemeanor charge, with the potential of up to 12 months in jail or a fine of $500 to 1,000.

No license on your person – When you are driving a motor vehicle in Georgia, you are required to carry your license in your immediate possession while driving and must produce a copy to law enforcement upon request. Driving without a valid license or driving with a suspended license – Driving without a valid license is treated more seriously than having no license on your person, and the penalties can include jail time, a fine, probation, and a license suspension or time added to an existing suspension.

What felonies will Florida extradite for

United States’ Extradition Clause – The Extradition Clause in the United States provides for the return of an individual charged with a crime in one state who is physically located in another state. Originally, the legal authority for interstate extradition was found in the Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution which states as follows: A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

What is the fleeing felon rule in Texas?

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia In common law, the fleeing felon rule permits the use of force, including deadly force, against an individual who is suspected of a felony and is in clear flight.

Can I own a gun with an expunged felony in Florida?

Hunting with a felony conviction In regard to use of firearms by felons: It is illegal in Florida for convicted felons to possess firearms, including muzzleloading guns, unless they have had their civil rights restored or the gun qualifies as an antique firearm under Florida statute 790.001(1).

• Properly licensed convicted felons may hunt with bows, crossbows and airguns during hunting seasons when such devices are legal.
• A general restoration of civil rights does not include the restoration of the right to own, possess or use a firearm.
• In order to restore firearm authority, an application is required and there is a waiting period of eight years from the date sentence expired or supervision terminated.

For more information on the clemency process and eligibility requirements, go to the Web site. Section 790.001(1), Florida Statutes, states, “‘Antique firearm’ means any firearm manufactured in or before 1918 (including any matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar early type of ignition system) or replica thereof, whether actually manufactured before or after the year 1918, and also any firearm using fixed ammunition manufactured in or before 1918, for which ammunition is no longer manufactured in the United States and is not readily available in the ordinary channels of commercial trade.” Convicted felons should be cautious about being in a location where a firearm is present as they may be in constructive possession of that firearm.

Constructive possession occurs when the person knows about the firearm and is in a position to exert dominion and control over that firearm. A felon who is riding in a truck with other hunters who have firearms with them may be in constructive possession of those firearms, depending on the circumstances.

Convicted felons, as well as any hunter, may use a bow, crossbow or airguns during where allowed. Hunters who are on probation, should consult with their probation officer before hunting. : Hunting with a felony conviction

Does Florida have a no chase law for motorcycles?

MOTORCYCLES – Motorcycle officers will not participate in pursuits due to the extreme hazards to the officers.8.

Does Florida have a fleeing felon law

Arrest felon defined ARREST-“FELON” DEFINED; WHEN DEADLY FORCE MAY BE USED IN APPREHENDING FLEEING FELON; NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARMED AND UNARMED FELONS OR BETWEEN CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS AND AGAINST PROPERTY To: E. Wilson Purdy, Dade County Public Safety Director, Miami Prepared by: Sharyn L.

• Smith, Assistant Attorney General QUESTIONS: 1.
• Does the term “felon” as used in s.776.05, F.S., refer only to a person who has actually been convicted of a felony? 2.
• If the answer to question 1 is in the negative, may the term be applied to anyone whom the arresting officer has reason to believe has committed a felony when the use of force is necessary to effect an arrest? 3.

Is the phrase “fleeing from justice” applicable to a setting where a police officer, after having identified himself as such and ordered an individual reasonably believed to have committed a felony to halt, uses necessary force, including deadly force, in arresting such person? 4.

Does s.776.05, F.S., make any distinction as to whether an individual whom the officer reasonably believes is a felon is armed or unarmed? 5. Does s.776.05, F.S., make any distinction between a felony crime against property rather than against a person or persons? SUMMARY: The term “felon” as used in s.776.05, F.S., as amended, is a descriptive reference used by the Legislature in order to differentiate between categories of crimes, i.e,, felonies as opposed to misdemeanors, and was not intended to be limited to persons actually convicted of a felony.

If an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been or is being committed, that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it, and that the person to be arrested is fleeing from or escaping arrest, the officer is justified in using any force necessarily committed in retaking or arresting such person, provided that no more force is used than is reasonably necessary to apprehend the person to be arrested or to effectuate such arrest.

• Section 776.05, F.S., makes no distinction between armed and unarmed felons.
• Section 776.05, F.S., makes no distinction between felony crimes against property rather than against a person or persons.
• Before answering your specific questions, a review of the law which has been formulated regarding the use of deadly force by police officers when arresting felons or retaking fleeing felons is necessitated.

The history of this legal issue over the past 50 years has been said to be characterized by “shifting sands and obscured pathways.” Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 141 (2nd Cir.1975). It is an issue on which the courts and commentators throughout the country have long disagreed.

See Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), s.26, p.134. Generally, two rules have been either adopted or urged for adoption regarding the scope of an officer’s privilege to use a firearm. The first can be characterized as the “traditional rule” and finds its basis initially in the early common law. The second, for purposes of this discussion, will be referred to as the “modern rule” and finds its initial support in treatises such as the American Law Institute Restatement of Torts s.131 (1934).

At early common law, the rule was that a felon was an outlaw whose life could be taken in the process of effecting an arrest without regard to whether he could otherwise be detained. The rationale of this rule was that all felonies were punishable by death.

• See McDonald, Use of Force by Police to Effect Lawful Arrest, 9 Crim.L.Q.435, 437; Moreland, Some Trends in the Law of Arrest, 39 Minn.L. Rev.479.
• At common law, felonies included murder, rape, manslaughter, sodomy, mayhem, burglary, arson, and robbery.1 Wharton Criminal Law s.26.
• This privilege to use firearms was extended to all persons, whether law officer or private citizen.

The common law rule was later refined to reflect a “last resort” factor, so that an officer was not entitled to take the life of a fleeing felon unless the arrest could not otherwise be effected. See Blackstone’s Commentaries, bk.4, Ch. XIV, at 827 (Gavit ed.1941).

1. Additionally, the concept of probable cause became a factor in American jurisprudence.
2. Even under the common law rule, the officer must actually and reasonably believe that the individual has committed or is committing a felony.
3. During the 20th century the common law principles set forth above became the subject of extensive comment and debate.

A few American courts adopted the rule initially formulated in the First Restatement of Torts s.131 (1934) that authorized the use of deadly force only for arrests for treason and felonies which normally cause or threaten death or serious bodily harm or which involve the breaking and entry of a dwelling place.

This rule, however, was overturned by the institute in 1948. See Restatement of the Law, 1948 Supp., Torts s.131 at 628 et seq. (1949). Presently the restatement permits the privilege only when the arrest is for treason or any felony which has been committed; when the officer reasonably believes the (felony) offense was committed by the person; and that the arrest cannot otherwise be effected.

The 1934 Restatement was criticized by the author of the 1948 Supplement on the grounds that while the 1934 rule might be a “desirable rule,” practically every case which has considered the question agrees that the original English Common Law is still the law.

1. However, on this issue the restatement and the Model Penal Code, adopted by the institute in 1962, have parted company.
2. The authors of the code have concluded that deadly force can be used to prevent the commission of a felony only when the felony involves substantial risk to life and limb.
3. ALI Model Penal Code, s.3.07(2)(b)(iv) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).

Accord : Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police 189 (1967). By contrast, the latest restatement simply carries forward the common law rule readopted by the 1948 Supplement.

See Second Restatement of Torts s.131 (1965). While the proposed Federal Criminal Code recommends adoption of the modern rule, a majority of the states have statutes which seek to codify the common law. United States National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code, s.607(2)(d)(1970).

Although a number of federal courts have stated that the preferable rule would limit the privilege to the situation when the crime involved causes or threatens serious bodily harm, they have thus far uniformly declined to impose this rule as a federal standard in civil rights cases.

• Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 140 (2nd Cir.1975).
• This refusal is based on history and current status of the law of privilege, the ready availability of handguns to the populace at large (including nonviolent felons), and the needs of law enforcement in a society where violence is widespread.
• Until 1974, Florida was among those states in which the common law rule regarding lawful use of the privilege was in full force and effect.

Cf. AGO 071-41. In AGO 071-41 this office, citing Dixon v. State, 132 So.684 (Fla.1931), City of Miami v. Nelson, 186 So.2d 535 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1966), and Gordon v. Alexander, 198 So.2d 325 (Fla.1967), concluded that, in making an arrest for a felony, an officer having reasonable grounds to believe the individual had committed a felony was entitled to use that degree of force reasonably necessary to effect his capture, even to the extent of killing or wounding.

This is true even though the life of the person making the arrest has not been endangered. See 6A C.J.S. Arrest s.49, pp.112-114. These Florida decisions clearly follow the “traditional rule” discussed, supra, regarding use of the privilege. However, in 1974, the Florida Legislature abandoned the traditional common law rule in favor of the “modern rule” advocated by the Model Penal Code.

Chapter 74-383, Laws of Florida. In the 1974 Criminal Code Revision, the Florida Legislature authorized the use of deadly force only in certain limited situations. Generally, the use of deadly force was authorized by an officer only when necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or another or when he reasonably believes both that: Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape; and the person to be arrested has committed or attempted a felony or is attempting to escape by use of a weapon or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life, or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay.

In 1975, the Legislature significantly amended Ch.74-383, s.776.05, F.S., to eliminate the restrictions imposed by the 1974 revisions regarding endangering human life or infliction of great bodily harm. In legal effect, the 1975 amendments to s.776.05, F.S., have codified the traditional common law rule and returned Florida to the law as it existed at the time AGO 071-41 was issued.

See City of St. Petersburg v. Reed, 330 So.2d 256, 257 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1976). Thus, the answers to your specific questions involve an analysis of s.776.05, read in light of the common law principles it codified, regarding use of deadly force by a police officer.

AS TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 2: Section 776.05, F.S., provides: “776.05 Law enforcement officers; use of force in making an arrest. – A law enforcement officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest.

He is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest or when necessarily committed in retaking felons who have escaped or when necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice.” Section 776.06, F.S., defines “deadly force” as force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, including, but not limited to, the firing of a firearm in the direction of a person to be arrested even if there is no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and the firing of a firearm at a vehicle in which the person to be arrested is riding.

In examining these statutes, I am of the view that the term “felon” as used in s.776.05, F.S., is a descriptive reference used by the Legislature in order to differentiate between categories of crimes, i.e., felonies as opposed to misdemeanors, and was not intended to be limited to persons actually convicted of a felony.

See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 156 S.E.2d 135, 207 Va.326; Mack v. State of Delaware, 312 A.2d 319; Black’s Law Dictionary, pp.743, 744; s.10, Art. X, State Const. The felony/misdemeanor distinction has been recognized because it is generally agreed that an arrest for a misdemeanor does not justify the use of a firearm even though the criminal is in flight and there is no other possible way to apprehend him.

Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) s.26, p.135, and cases cited at n.5; Comment, 31 La.L.Rev.131, 134. Moreover, “felon” has been defined as a person who commits, or one who has committed, a felony. See 36A C.J.S. Felon, at p.253; Black’s Law Dictionary, at p.743. The title of Ch.75-64, Laws of Florida, which amends s.776.05, F.S., makes it clear that the statute is concerned with and authorizes law enforcement officers to use “deadly force when retaking or arresting a fleeing felon.” If an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been or is being committed, that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it, and that the person to be arrested is fleeing from or escaping arrest, the officer, pursuant to s.776.05, is justified in using any force necessarily committed in retaking or arresting such person, provided that no more force is used than is reasonably necessary to apprehend the person to be arrested or to effectuate such arrest.

This view is in accord with AGO 071-41, supra, in which a police officer was said to possess the authority to use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing armed or unarmed felon as a last resort when the officer reasonably believes that the person to be apprehended has committed or is committing a felony.

1. In City of Miami v.
2. Nelson, supra, the court, in response to a claim for money damages for a shooting arising out of the arrest of Nelson for attempted breaking and entering, stated at 538: “Having reasonable grounds to believe J.C.
3. Nelson had committed a felony, the officers were entitled to use force which was reasonably necessary to capture him, even to the extent of killing or wounding him,

See: 6 C.J.S. Arrest s.13, p.613 (now 6A C.J.S., Arrest s.49); Commonwealth v. Bollinger, 198 Ky.646, 249 S.W.786.” (Emphasis supplied.) This statement in Nelson was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Gordon v. Alexander, 198 So.2d 325, 326, 327 (Fla.1967), in which the court denied Alexander’s claim for damages against a police officer and city for the officer’s shooting of Alexander whom the officer was attempting to arrest for breaking and entering, a felony.

Recently, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, considered the question of the use of deadly force in effectuating an arrest and concurred in that portion of AGO 071-41 which dealt with the questions posed by your inquiry. See Chastain v. Civil Service Board of Orlando, 327 So.2d 230, 232 (4 D.C.A.

Fla., 1975). Also see City of St. Petersburg v. Reed, supra, in which the court stated that the decisional rule of Nelson and Alexander had been codified in s.776.05, F.S., by Ch.75-64, Laws of Florida. AS TO QUESTION 3: Section 901.17, F.S., provides: “A peace officer making an arrest without a warrant shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of arrest except when the person flees or forcibly resists before the officer has an opportunity to inform him or when giving the information will imperil the arrest.” Additionally, in the event an arrest warrant has been issued, the officer must advise the person to be arrested of that fact unless the person is fleeing or the recital of this information would imperil the arrest.

Section 901.16, F.S. Thus, when ss.901.17 and 776.05, F.S., are construed together, an officer must inform a person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and his authority, AGO 071-41, except when a person flees or forcibly resists before an officer has the opportunity to inform him or when giving the information would imperil the arrest.

The officer is authorized to use deadly force if he reasonably believes that a felony has been or is being committed, if he reasonably believes that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it, and if he reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to retake a felon who has escaped or to arrest a felon fleeing from justice, provided that no more force is used than is reasonably necessary to apprehend such felon or to effectuate an arrest.

The term “fleeing from justice” has been defined as removing oneself from, or secreting oneself within, the jurisdiction where the offense was committed, or leaving one’s home, residence, or known place of abode or concealing oneself therein with intent, in either case, to avoid detection and prosecution for some public offense.36A C.J.S.

Flee, p.753; 17 Words and Phrases, pp.252-256; Black’s Law Dictionary, Rev’d.4th Ed., at p.767. One “flees from justice” when one absconds or flees from the arresting or prosecuting officers of the state with a purpose to avoid detection. State v. Berryhill, 177 So.663, 665 (La.1937).

AS TO QUESTION 4: The statute makes no distinction between armed and unarmed felons. The only differentiation recognized by the Legislature in enacting s.776.05, F.S., is between felons and misdemeanants. Accordingly, I do not believe the Legislature intended to limit the power of police officers to effectuate arrests of felons fleeing from justice to those instances where the person to be arrested is armed.

Attorney General Opinion 071-41 is to the same effect and is hereby confirmed and ratified. It might be noted that the facts recited in Reed, and in Nelson and Alexander, supra, indicate that the involved felons were unarmed. AS TO QUESTION 5: I must again reiterate what was stated in response to question 4 – since the Legislature made no such distinction when enacting s.776.05, F.S., none was intended and cannot be implied.

Accord : City of St. Petersburg v. Reed, supra, at pp.257-258, stating that the “right does not depend on the type of felony which has been committed”; AGO 071-41. It should be noted, however, that the constitutional due process issue posed by this question is presently the subject of litigation in several federal courts under the federal civil rights acts.

Recently, many state legislatures have enacted statutes similar to s.776.05, F.S., which in essence authorize the use of deadly force by police officers when necessary in order to apprehend felons fleeing from arrest. As of 1975, thirty-four states authorized the use of deadly force by police officers under such circumstances.

Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp.643 (E.D. Mo.1975). Recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of such a Connecticut statute, stating: “Here we are dealing with competing interests of society of the very highest rank – interests in protecting human life against unwarranted invasion, and in promoting peaceable surrender to the exertion of law enforcement authority.

The balance that has been struck to date is very likely not the best one that can be. In an area where any balance is imperfect, however, there must be some room under s.1983 for different views to prevail. The Connecticut rule carries with it the defects explicated above; it makes no distinction between felonies and therefore could be argued to involve an element of irrationality.

It also creates an anomalous asymmetry to the privilege relating to the use of force for preventing the commission of felonies. Furthermore, it is contrary to the recommendations of the new proposed federal criminal code, see U.S. National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code s.607(2)(d) (1970), and the statute law of one of the other two states in this circuit, New York, N.Y.

Penal Law s.35.30(1)(a) (McKinney 1975), although apparently not of the other, 13 Vt.Stat. Ann.s.2305 (1974). This would seem peculiarly to be one of those areas where some room must be left to the individual states to place a higher value on the interest in this case of peace, order, and vigorous law enforcement, than on the rights of individuals reasonably suspected to have engaged in the commission of a serious crime.

While the Fourteenth Amendment may require us to make an independent assessment of the fairness of the state rule, however, we are today interpreting s.1983, and within that statute the states must be given some leeway in the administration of their systems of justice, at least insofar as determining the scope of such an unsettled rule as an arresting officer’s privilege for the use of deadly force.

Further, in the light of the shifting history of the privilege, we cannot conclude that the Connecticut rule is fundamentally unfair.” Also see Jones v. Marshall, 383 F. Supp.358 (D. Conn.1974), and compare, Clark v. Ziedonis, 368 F. Supp.544 (E.D. Wis.1973), aff’d, 513 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.1975); Smith v.

Wickline, 396 F. Supp.555 (D. Okla.1975); Schumann v. McGinn, 240 N.W.2d 525 (Minn.1976). A similar constitutional challenge to a Missouri “deadly force” statute is presently pending before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. I have been informed that this case, Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir.1974), on remand, 404 F.

Supp.643 (E.D. Mo.1975), was scheduled for oral argument before the Eighth Circuit en banc on August 17, 1976. : Arrest felon defined

What is third-degree felony in Florida?

What Crimes Result in a Third Degree Felony Charge? – There are many different crimes that can result in a third-degree felony in Florida. Additionally, certain misdemeanor charges may be upgraded to a third-degree felony offense under specific circumstances.

Most drug crimes, including possession charges and cultivation of cannabis Grand theft Aggravated assault or felony battery Carrying a concealed firearm without a license Resisting arrest with violence or battery on a law enforcement officer Leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury DUI with serious bodily injury or a third DUI arrest within ten years Aggravated stalking Bribery Child abuse or neglect Fraud Burglary Driving with a suspended license Exploitation of an elderly or disabled person And more

This list is not comprehensive, and there are many other crimes that can be charged as a third-degree felony in the state of Florida. If you do not see your alleged crime on this list and are facing a third-degree felony charge, contact Weinstein Legal today to discuss your unique case.

What are the elements of fleeing and eluding in Florida

What Is a Fleeing and Eluding Charge in Florida? – Florida Statute § 316.1935 explains that fleeing and eluding takes place when a law enforcement officer directs a driver to pull over and they refuse or fail to stop the vehicle. Fleeing and eluding can also occur when the driver stops the vehicle and then flees in an attempt to evade the officer.

Given that the driver is trying to elude the police or law enforcement officer, driving at high speed or in a reckless manner is a common and aggravated element of fleeing and eluding in Florida. According to the law, reckless driving consists of driving without looking after the safety of others or property.

Depending on the severity of the offense, a defendant could face a simple or an aggravated charge of fleeing and eluding in Florida. Aggravated fleeing and eluding occurs when the driver:

Caused injuries or death to another person;Caused property damage.

Aggravated fleeing and eluding charge in Florida is treated as a separate offense. In other words, if you were accused of aggravated fleeing and eluding, and left the scene of the accident, the prosecution could also file charges for hit and run,

What is the charge for fleeing the scene of a crime in Florida

Fleeing the Scene of an Accident involving Bodily Injury – Florida Statute 316.027(2)(a)-(b) – If a person flees the scene of an accident involving non-serious bodily injury, the offense is charged as a third-degree felony. The penalties associated with a third-degree felony conviction include a prison term of up to five years, probation for five years, and a monetary fine of $5,000.

1. The offense can be charged as a second-degree felony if serious bodily injury resulted from the crash.
2. Under Florida Statute Section 316.027(1)(a), “serious bodily injury” means “an injury to a person, including the driver, which consists of a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death, serious personal disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ.” The penalties associated with a second-degree felony conviction include a prison term of up to fifteen years, fifteen years of probation, and a monetary fine of $10,000.

The distinction between a serious and non-serious injury is often not clear in these types of cases. A seasoned Florida criminal defense attorney at Musca Law can help you to bring forth defenses to establish that no bodily injury occurred or that the bodily injury sustained by the other driver was non-serious as opposed to serious.

Does Florida have a fleeing felon law?

Arrest felon defined ARREST-“FELON” DEFINED; WHEN DEADLY FORCE MAY BE USED IN APPREHENDING FLEEING FELON; NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARMED AND UNARMED FELONS OR BETWEEN CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS AND AGAINST PROPERTY To: E. Wilson Purdy, Dade County Public Safety Director, Miami Prepared by: Sharyn L.

• Smith, Assistant Attorney General QUESTIONS: 1.
• Does the term “felon” as used in s.776.05, F.S., refer only to a person who has actually been convicted of a felony? 2.
• If the answer to question 1 is in the negative, may the term be applied to anyone whom the arresting officer has reason to believe has committed a felony when the use of force is necessary to effect an arrest? 3.

Is the phrase “fleeing from justice” applicable to a setting where a police officer, after having identified himself as such and ordered an individual reasonably believed to have committed a felony to halt, uses necessary force, including deadly force, in arresting such person? 4.

• Does s.776.05, F.S., make any distinction as to whether an individual whom the officer reasonably believes is a felon is armed or unarmed? 5.
• Does s.776.05, F.S., make any distinction between a felony crime against property rather than against a person or persons? SUMMARY: The term “felon” as used in s.776.05, F.S., as amended, is a descriptive reference used by the Legislature in order to differentiate between categories of crimes, i.e,, felonies as opposed to misdemeanors, and was not intended to be limited to persons actually convicted of a felony.

If an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been or is being committed, that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it, and that the person to be arrested is fleeing from or escaping arrest, the officer is justified in using any force necessarily committed in retaking or arresting such person, provided that no more force is used than is reasonably necessary to apprehend the person to be arrested or to effectuate such arrest.

1. Section 776.05, F.S., makes no distinction between armed and unarmed felons.
2. Section 776.05, F.S., makes no distinction between felony crimes against property rather than against a person or persons.
3. Before answering your specific questions, a review of the law which has been formulated regarding the use of deadly force by police officers when arresting felons or retaking fleeing felons is necessitated.

The history of this legal issue over the past 50 years has been said to be characterized by “shifting sands and obscured pathways.” Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 141 (2nd Cir.1975). It is an issue on which the courts and commentators throughout the country have long disagreed.

See Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), s.26, p.134. Generally, two rules have been either adopted or urged for adoption regarding the scope of an officer’s privilege to use a firearm. The first can be characterized as the “traditional rule” and finds its basis initially in the early common law. The second, for purposes of this discussion, will be referred to as the “modern rule” and finds its initial support in treatises such as the American Law Institute Restatement of Torts s.131 (1934).

At early common law, the rule was that a felon was an outlaw whose life could be taken in the process of effecting an arrest without regard to whether he could otherwise be detained. The rationale of this rule was that all felonies were punishable by death.

See McDonald, Use of Force by Police to Effect Lawful Arrest, 9 Crim.L.Q.435, 437; Moreland, Some Trends in the Law of Arrest, 39 Minn.L. Rev.479. At common law, felonies included murder, rape, manslaughter, sodomy, mayhem, burglary, arson, and robbery.1 Wharton Criminal Law s.26. This privilege to use firearms was extended to all persons, whether law officer or private citizen.

The common law rule was later refined to reflect a “last resort” factor, so that an officer was not entitled to take the life of a fleeing felon unless the arrest could not otherwise be effected. See Blackstone’s Commentaries, bk.4, Ch. XIV, at 827 (Gavit ed.1941).

Additionally, the concept of probable cause became a factor in American jurisprudence. Even under the common law rule, the officer must actually and reasonably believe that the individual has committed or is committing a felony. During the 20th century the common law principles set forth above became the subject of extensive comment and debate.

A few American courts adopted the rule initially formulated in the First Restatement of Torts s.131 (1934) that authorized the use of deadly force only for arrests for treason and felonies which normally cause or threaten death or serious bodily harm or which involve the breaking and entry of a dwelling place.

1. This rule, however, was overturned by the institute in 1948.
2. See Restatement of the Law, 1948 Supp., Torts s.131 at 628 et seq. (1949).
3. Presently the restatement permits the privilege only when the arrest is for treason or any felony which has been committed; when the officer reasonably believes the (felony) offense was committed by the person; and that the arrest cannot otherwise be effected.

The 1934 Restatement was criticized by the author of the 1948 Supplement on the grounds that while the 1934 rule might be a “desirable rule,” practically every case which has considered the question agrees that the original English Common Law is still the law.

However, on this issue the restatement and the Model Penal Code, adopted by the institute in 1962, have parted company. The authors of the code have concluded that deadly force can be used to prevent the commission of a felony only when the felony involves substantial risk to life and limb. ALI Model Penal Code, s.3.07(2)(b)(iv) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).

Accord : Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police 189 (1967). By contrast, the latest restatement simply carries forward the common law rule readopted by the 1948 Supplement.

See Second Restatement of Torts s.131 (1965). While the proposed Federal Criminal Code recommends adoption of the modern rule, a majority of the states have statutes which seek to codify the common law. United States National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code, s.607(2)(d)(1970).

Although a number of federal courts have stated that the preferable rule would limit the privilege to the situation when the crime involved causes or threatens serious bodily harm, they have thus far uniformly declined to impose this rule as a federal standard in civil rights cases.

Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 140 (2nd Cir.1975). This refusal is based on history and current status of the law of privilege, the ready availability of handguns to the populace at large (including nonviolent felons), and the needs of law enforcement in a society where violence is widespread. Until 1974, Florida was among those states in which the common law rule regarding lawful use of the privilege was in full force and effect.

Cf. AGO 071-41. In AGO 071-41 this office, citing Dixon v. State, 132 So.684 (Fla.1931), City of Miami v. Nelson, 186 So.2d 535 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1966), and Gordon v. Alexander, 198 So.2d 325 (Fla.1967), concluded that, in making an arrest for a felony, an officer having reasonable grounds to believe the individual had committed a felony was entitled to use that degree of force reasonably necessary to effect his capture, even to the extent of killing or wounding.

1. This is true even though the life of the person making the arrest has not been endangered.
2. See 6A C.J.S.
3. Arrest s.49, pp.112-114.
4. These Florida decisions clearly follow the “traditional rule” discussed, supra, regarding use of the privilege.
5. However, in 1974, the Florida Legislature abandoned the traditional common law rule in favor of the “modern rule” advocated by the Model Penal Code.

Chapter 74-383, Laws of Florida. In the 1974 Criminal Code Revision, the Florida Legislature authorized the use of deadly force only in certain limited situations. Generally, the use of deadly force was authorized by an officer only when necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or another or when he reasonably believes both that: Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape; and the person to be arrested has committed or attempted a felony or is attempting to escape by use of a weapon or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life, or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay.

In 1975, the Legislature significantly amended Ch.74-383, s.776.05, F.S., to eliminate the restrictions imposed by the 1974 revisions regarding endangering human life or infliction of great bodily harm. In legal effect, the 1975 amendments to s.776.05, F.S., have codified the traditional common law rule and returned Florida to the law as it existed at the time AGO 071-41 was issued.

See City of St. Petersburg v. Reed, 330 So.2d 256, 257 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1976). Thus, the answers to your specific questions involve an analysis of s.776.05, read in light of the common law principles it codified, regarding use of deadly force by a police officer.

AS TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 2: Section 776.05, F.S., provides: “776.05 Law enforcement officers; use of force in making an arrest. – A law enforcement officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest.

He is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest or when necessarily committed in retaking felons who have escaped or when necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice.” Section 776.06, F.S., defines “deadly force” as force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, including, but not limited to, the firing of a firearm in the direction of a person to be arrested even if there is no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and the firing of a firearm at a vehicle in which the person to be arrested is riding.

1. In examining these statutes, I am of the view that the term “felon” as used in s.776.05, F.S., is a descriptive reference used by the Legislature in order to differentiate between categories of crimes, i.e.
2. Felonies as opposed to misdemeanors, and was not intended to be limited to persons actually convicted of a felony.

See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 156 S.E.2d 135, 207 Va.326; Mack v. State of Delaware, 312 A.2d 319; Black’s Law Dictionary, pp.743, 744; s.10, Art. X, State Const. The felony/misdemeanor distinction has been recognized because it is generally agreed that an arrest for a misdemeanor does not justify the use of a firearm even though the criminal is in flight and there is no other possible way to apprehend him.

• Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) s.26, p.135, and cases cited at n.5; Comment, 31 La.L.Rev.131, 134.
• Moreover, “felon” has been defined as a person who commits, or one who has committed, a felony.
• See 36A C.J.S.
• Felon, at p.253; Black’s Law Dictionary, at p.743.
• The title of Ch.75-64, Laws of Florida, which amends s.776.05, F.S., makes it clear that the statute is concerned with and authorizes law enforcement officers to use “deadly force when retaking or arresting a fleeing felon.” If an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been or is being committed, that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it, and that the person to be arrested is fleeing from or escaping arrest, the officer, pursuant to s.776.05, is justified in using any force necessarily committed in retaking or arresting such person, provided that no more force is used than is reasonably necessary to apprehend the person to be arrested or to effectuate such arrest.

This view is in accord with AGO 071-41, supra, in which a police officer was said to possess the authority to use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing armed or unarmed felon as a last resort when the officer reasonably believes that the person to be apprehended has committed or is committing a felony.

• In City of Miami v.
• Nelson, supra, the court, in response to a claim for money damages for a shooting arising out of the arrest of Nelson for attempted breaking and entering, stated at 538: “Having reasonable grounds to believe J.C.
• Nelson had committed a felony, the officers were entitled to use force which was reasonably necessary to capture him, even to the extent of killing or wounding him,

See: 6 C.J.S. Arrest s.13, p.613 (now 6A C.J.S., Arrest s.49); Commonwealth v. Bollinger, 198 Ky.646, 249 S.W.786.” (Emphasis supplied.) This statement in Nelson was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Gordon v. Alexander, 198 So.2d 325, 326, 327 (Fla.1967), in which the court denied Alexander’s claim for damages against a police officer and city for the officer’s shooting of Alexander whom the officer was attempting to arrest for breaking and entering, a felony.

Recently, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, considered the question of the use of deadly force in effectuating an arrest and concurred in that portion of AGO 071-41 which dealt with the questions posed by your inquiry. See Chastain v. Civil Service Board of Orlando, 327 So.2d 230, 232 (4 D.C.A.

Fla., 1975). Also see City of St. Petersburg v. Reed, supra, in which the court stated that the decisional rule of Nelson and Alexander had been codified in s.776.05, F.S., by Ch.75-64, Laws of Florida. AS TO QUESTION 3: Section 901.17, F.S., provides: “A peace officer making an arrest without a warrant shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of arrest except when the person flees or forcibly resists before the officer has an opportunity to inform him or when giving the information will imperil the arrest.” Additionally, in the event an arrest warrant has been issued, the officer must advise the person to be arrested of that fact unless the person is fleeing or the recital of this information would imperil the arrest.

Section 901.16, F.S. Thus, when ss.901.17 and 776.05, F.S., are construed together, an officer must inform a person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and his authority, AGO 071-41, except when a person flees or forcibly resists before an officer has the opportunity to inform him or when giving the information would imperil the arrest.

The officer is authorized to use deadly force if he reasonably believes that a felony has been or is being committed, if he reasonably believes that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it, and if he reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to retake a felon who has escaped or to arrest a felon fleeing from justice, provided that no more force is used than is reasonably necessary to apprehend such felon or to effectuate an arrest.

The term “fleeing from justice” has been defined as removing oneself from, or secreting oneself within, the jurisdiction where the offense was committed, or leaving one’s home, residence, or known place of abode or concealing oneself therein with intent, in either case, to avoid detection and prosecution for some public offense.36A C.J.S.

Flee, p.753; 17 Words and Phrases, pp.252-256; Black’s Law Dictionary, Rev’d.4th Ed., at p.767. One “flees from justice” when one absconds or flees from the arresting or prosecuting officers of the state with a purpose to avoid detection. State v. Berryhill, 177 So.663, 665 (La.1937).

AS TO QUESTION 4: The statute makes no distinction between armed and unarmed felons. The only differentiation recognized by the Legislature in enacting s.776.05, F.S., is between felons and misdemeanants. Accordingly, I do not believe the Legislature intended to limit the power of police officers to effectuate arrests of felons fleeing from justice to those instances where the person to be arrested is armed.

Attorney General Opinion 071-41 is to the same effect and is hereby confirmed and ratified. It might be noted that the facts recited in Reed, and in Nelson and Alexander, supra, indicate that the involved felons were unarmed. AS TO QUESTION 5: I must again reiterate what was stated in response to question 4 – since the Legislature made no such distinction when enacting s.776.05, F.S., none was intended and cannot be implied.

• Accord : City of St.
• Petersburg v.
• Reed, supra, at pp.257-258, stating that the “right does not depend on the type of felony which has been committed”; AGO 071-41.
• It should be noted, however, that the constitutional due process issue posed by this question is presently the subject of litigation in several federal courts under the federal civil rights acts.

Recently, many state legislatures have enacted statutes similar to s.776.05, F.S., which in essence authorize the use of deadly force by police officers when necessary in order to apprehend felons fleeing from arrest. As of 1975, thirty-four states authorized the use of deadly force by police officers under such circumstances.

1. Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F.
2. Supp.643 (E.D. Mo.1975).
3. Recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of such a Connecticut statute, stating: “Here we are dealing with competing interests of society of the very highest rank – interests in protecting human life against unwarranted invasion, and in promoting peaceable surrender to the exertion of law enforcement authority.

The balance that has been struck to date is very likely not the best one that can be. In an area where any balance is imperfect, however, there must be some room under s.1983 for different views to prevail. The Connecticut rule carries with it the defects explicated above; it makes no distinction between felonies and therefore could be argued to involve an element of irrationality.

1. It also creates an anomalous asymmetry to the privilege relating to the use of force for preventing the commission of felonies.
2. Furthermore, it is contrary to the recommendations of the new proposed federal criminal code, see U.S.
3. National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code s.607(2)(d) (1970), and the statute law of one of the other two states in this circuit, New York, N.Y.

Penal Law s.35.30(1)(a) (McKinney 1975), although apparently not of the other, 13 Vt.Stat. Ann.s.2305 (1974). This would seem peculiarly to be one of those areas where some room must be left to the individual states to place a higher value on the interest in this case of peace, order, and vigorous law enforcement, than on the rights of individuals reasonably suspected to have engaged in the commission of a serious crime.

While the Fourteenth Amendment may require us to make an independent assessment of the fairness of the state rule, however, we are today interpreting s.1983, and within that statute the states must be given some leeway in the administration of their systems of justice, at least insofar as determining the scope of such an unsettled rule as an arresting officer’s privilege for the use of deadly force.

Further, in the light of the shifting history of the privilege, we cannot conclude that the Connecticut rule is fundamentally unfair.” Also see Jones v. Marshall, 383 F. Supp.358 (D. Conn.1974), and compare, Clark v. Ziedonis, 368 F. Supp.544 (E.D. Wis.1973), aff’d, 513 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.1975); Smith v.

Wickline, 396 F. Supp.555 (D. Okla.1975); Schumann v. McGinn, 240 N.W.2d 525 (Minn.1976). A similar constitutional challenge to a Missouri “deadly force” statute is presently pending before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. I have been informed that this case, Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir.1974), on remand, 404 F.

How To Beat Eluding Police Charges – \

Supp.643 (E.D. Mo.1975), was scheduled for oral argument before the Eighth Circuit en banc on August 17, 1976. : Arrest felon defined

What is third degree felony in Florida?

What Crimes Result in a Third Degree Felony Charge? – There are many different crimes that can result in a third-degree felony in Florida. Additionally, certain misdemeanor charges may be upgraded to a third-degree felony offense under specific circumstances.

Most drug crimes, including possession charges and cultivation of cannabis Grand theft Aggravated assault or felony battery Carrying a concealed firearm without a license Resisting arrest with violence or battery on a law enforcement officer Leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury DUI with serious bodily injury or a third DUI arrest within ten years Aggravated stalking Bribery Child abuse or neglect Fraud Burglary Driving with a suspended license Exploitation of an elderly or disabled person And more

This list is not comprehensive, and there are many other crimes that can be charged as a third-degree felony in the state of Florida. If you do not see your alleged crime on this list and are facing a third-degree felony charge, contact Weinstein Legal today to discuss your unique case.